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Westberg: Intellectual Property Law

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

NEW KIDS ON THE BLOCK v. NEWS
AMERICA PUBLISHING, INC.: NEW
NOMINATIVE USE DEFENSE INCREASES
THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
SURROUNDING THE FAIR USE DEFENSE
TO TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

I.

INTRODUCTION

In The New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc./ the Ninth Circuit held that two newspapers which ran
polls to gauge the popularity of a musical group were not liable
for trademark infringement.2 The decision by the Ninth Circuit
panel articulated a new defense to a charge of trademark infringement: the nominative fair use defense. 3
The Ninth Circuit's holding distinguishes between situations in which a defendant is using a rival's trademark to describe his own product and those in which he is describing the
1. The New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th
Cir. 1992) (per Kozinski, J., joined by Schroeder, J. and Orrick, District Judge for the
N.D. of Cal., sitting by designation).
2. ld. at 308. A trademark is a limited property right in a particular word, phrase or
symbol. See Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 900
(9th Cir. 1992). The purpose of a trademark is to identify the manufacturer or sponsor of
a good or the provider of a service. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 305. The most common exam·
pie of trademark infringement occurs when a competitor misappropriates a rival's trademark and places it on his own goods. ld. Thus, one of the primary goals of trademark law
is to prevent producers from free-riding on their rivals' marks. ld.; see infra notes 100112 for a more detailed explanation of trademark infringement law.
3. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308.
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rival's product by reference to the trademark.· In the first situation, the defendant may invoke the traditional "fair use" defense. 1i The second situation forms the basis for the Ninth Circuit's new "nominative use" defense. 6

The Ninth Circuit explained that if the following three requirements are met, nominative use constitutes a defense to
trademark infringement:' (1) the product or service must not be
readily describable without using the trademark, (2) only so
much of the trademark may be used as is reasonably necessary
to identify the product or services, and (3) the user must do
nothing in conjunction with the trademark as to suggest endorsement by the trademark holder.s
An explanation of trademark infringement and traditional
defenses to trademark infringement, with focus on the fair use
defense, follows. Through a comparison of the nominative use
defense to the traditional fair use defense, this article will
demonstrate that the nominative use defense is an unnecessary
and confusing addition to trademark law.
II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiffs, The New Kids on the Block (hereinafter
"New Kids"), are a popular musical group9 consisting of five
popular teenaged musicians.
The defendants, THE STAR and USA TODAY, are newspapers
4.Id.
5. The fair use defense applies when "the name, term, or device charged to be an
infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his
own business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a
term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe
the goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin . . . . " 15 U.S.C.
§ 1115(b)(4) (1988). For a more detailed explanation, see infra notes 70-95 and accompanying text.
6. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308. Nominative use refers to use of a trademark by someone other than its owner where the trademark is the only word reasonably available to
refer to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's product. For a more detailed explanation, see infra
notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
7. Id.
8. Id.
. 9. Id. at 304. There are over 500 products or services bearing the New Kids
trademark.
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with national circulation. 10 Both defendants operated "900"
phone numbers which charged their readers a fee for calling in
response to questions contained in their newspaper polls.11 The
USA TODAY ad contained a picture of the New Kids and asked,
"Who's the best on the block?" and "New Kids on the Block are
pop's hottest group. Which of the five is your fave? Or are they a
turn off?!I12 The ad proclaimed that any profits would go to
charity.13 At fifty cents per call, less than $300 was generated. 14
The ad in THE STAR contained a picture of the New Kids
and asked, "Now which kid is the sexiest?!I16 It also contained a
story about the New Kids that asked, "Which of the New Kids
on the Block would you most like to move next door? STAR
wants to know which cool New Kid is the hottest with our readers."18 At ninety-five cents per minute, the ad generated about
$1600. 17
The New Kids filed suit in federal district court, alleging
the newspapers violated trademark infringement laws by using
the New Kids' trademark in connection with the '900" number
telephone polls.18 The complaint alleged ten causes of action: 19
(1) common-law trademark infringement,20 (2) Lanham Act false
10. Ed.
11. Ed. Telephone "900" number services can be used in a variety of ways. They can
provide callers with recorded information, allow callers to engage in conversation on a
party line, or record information spoken by the caller. Callers operate the services by
punching in the appropriate numbers on the telephone key pad. Users of "900" numbers
are then charged a fee for the service. The New Kids on the Block v. News America
Publishing, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540, 1542 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
12. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308.
13. Ed.
14. Ed. The district court's opinion indicates that callers were charged fifty cents a
minute. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1542. The Ninth Circuit opinion quotes the ad as
stating, "Each call costs 50 cents." New Kids, 745 F.2d at 304.
15. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308.
16. Ed.
17. Ed. It is unclear whether the profits from this ad were also intended to go to
charity. See id.
18. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. 1540.
19. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 304-05. Although the New Kids alleged ten causes of
action, the district court never evaluated those claims on their merits because the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the newspaper defendants on other
grounds. Ed. at 305.
20. California common-law trademark infringement occurs when a trademark or
trade name is appropriated and used as such. Kelley Blue Book v. Car-Smarts, Inc., 802
F. Supp. 278, 289 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
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advertising,21 (3) Lanham Act false designation of origin,22 (4)
Lanham Act unfair competition,23 (5) state trade name infringement,24 (6) state false advertising,2~ (7) state unfair competition,26 (8) commercial misappropriation,27 (9) common-law misappropriation,28 and (10) intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage. 29
21. False Advertising under the Lanham Act consists of the following elements: (1)
the defendant made false statements in its advertisements, (2) the statements a~e deceptive, (3) the deception is material, (4) the defendant caused the falsely advertised goods
to enter interstate commerce, and (5) the plaintiff has been injured by diversion of sales
or loss of goodwill. Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern Cal. Coli. Serv., Inc., 911
F.2d 242, 243 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777,
783 (N.D. Ill. 1974)).
22. False designation of origin under the Lanham Act consists of making any false
or misleading representation in connection with goods which is likely to cause confusion
or mistake as to their origin. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l) (1992).
23. Unfair competition under the Lanham Act occurs when any person who, on or in
connection with goods or services, uses any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
false designation of origin, any false or misleading representation, or description of fact
which is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception as to the affiliation, connection,
or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval or his or her goods, services, or commercial activities. Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 802 F. Supp. 1386, 1399 (D. S.C. 1992) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(1988)).
24. A trade name is a word, name, symbol, or device used to identify a business,
vocation or occupation. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14208 (1987). The theory of trademark
and trade name infringement is that the seller is diverting business from his competitor
by passing off or fraudulently representing his goods to be those of the competitor. BERNARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity § 83 at 761 (1990).
25. False advertising consists of making representations in advertisements that mislead the public. See MAl Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 523 (9th Cir.
1993).
26. Unfair competition occurs when no valid trademark, copyright, or patent exits in
a particular name or design, the goods or services are known to the public by such a
name, design, or physical appearance, and the defendant imitates the name, design, or
physical appearance such that buyers may be deceived as to the origin of the goods or
services. BERNARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity § 86 at 762-63
(1990).
27. Commercial misappropriation occurs when a person knowingly uses the name,
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness of another on goods for the purpose of advertising or selling, without the person's consent. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (1984).
28. Common law misappropriation of name or likeness consists of the following elements: (1) the defendant used the plaintiff's identity, (2) the appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness was to the defendant's advantage, (3) lack of consent, and (4)
resulting injury. Eastwood v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 117 at 804-07 (4th ed. 1971); BERNARD E. WITKIN, CAL. PROCEDURE, Pleading § 606 at 2244 (2d ed. 1971)).
29. Intentional interference with prospective economic advantage consists of the following elements: (1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third person with the possibility of benefit to the plaintiff, (2) knowledge by the defendant of the
relationship, (3) intentional acts by the defendant to disrupt the relationship, (4) actual
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The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of
the newspaper defendants on First Amendment grounds. 30 The
basis of the decision was that "news-gathering" is protected by
the First Amendment, precluding a finding of trademark
infringement.31
III.

A.

BACKGROUND
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

A trademark holder can make out a prIma facie case of
trademark infringement by proving three elements: 32 (1) that
the trademark in question is a valid, legally protectable trademark,33 (2) that the plaintiff is the owner of the trademark,34
and (3) that the defendant's use of the mark or a similar mark
created a likelihood of confusion as to the origin of the goods. 311
Under the Lanham Act,36 a trademark holder who has registered 37 a trademark has a remedy for trademark infringement if
the defendant has used the mark or a similar mark in connection
with the sale of goods or services in a way that is likely to cause
confusion. 38 Registration of the mark, therefore, is presu~ed to
disruption of the relationship, and (5) damages to the plaintiff caused by the defendant's
acts. Morningstar, Inc., v. Superior Court, No. B075691, 1994 WL 86169, at '13 (Cal.
App. 2 Dist. March 18, 1994) (citing Blank v. Kirwan, 703 P.2d 58, 70 (1985».
30. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 305.
31. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1547.
32. See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 802 F. Supp. 1386, 1394 (D.S.C.
1992) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 373 (1991).
33. That the trademark must be a valid, legally protectable mark means that the
trademark must be capable of serving to identify and distinguish one producer's goods in
commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
34. The plaintiff must be the owner of the property right allegedly infringed to
bring suit. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1992).
35. Likelihood of confusion means that the similarity of the trademarks is likely to
confuse customers about the source of the products. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss,
6 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing E & J Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d
1280, 1290 (9th Cir. 1990». The factors include: the strength of the mark, the proximity
of the marks, the similarity of the marks, evidence of actual confusion, marketing chan. nels used, type of goods, degree of care likely to be used by a purchaser, defendant's
intent in selecting a mark and likelihood of expansion of product lines. Official Airline
Guides, 6 F.2d at 1391 (citing AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th
Cir. 1979».
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1992) (covering trademarks).
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1992) (covering federal registration of trademarks).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1992).
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establish the first two elements of trademark infringement. 39
Once a trademark has been registered and used continuously for
five years, it becomes incontestable. 40 Incontestability is deemed
conclusive evidence of the first two elements. 41

B.

REBUTTING

A

PRIMA FACIE CASE

A trademark infringement suit may be rebutted by attacking any element that is necessary to the plaintiff's case. Because
likelihood of confusion is always an element of the plaintiff's
prima facie case, a defendant in a trademark infringement action may rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case by showing that
the defendant's use was not confusing to consumers. 42

R. G. Smith v. Chanel, Inc. 43 is a Ninth Circuit case in
which the plaintiff failed to show likelihood of confusion. In
R. G. Smith, the plaintiff produced a perfume under the trademark "Chanel No.5."" The defendant sold a competing perfume under the name "Second Chance."411 In an advertisement
directed at wholesale purchasers, the defendant claimed that its
perfume duplicated the scent of the plaintiff's perfume.4 6 The
advertisement suggested that a blindfold test be used on prospective customers where they were dared to "detect any difference between" Chanel No.5, which sold for $25.00, and Second
Chance, which sold for $7.00.4 7
39. Shakespeare, 802 F. Supp. at 1394.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1988).
41. Shakespeare, 802 F. Supp. at 1394 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor
Prods. Inc. 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir. 1991». See also 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) ("To the
extent that the right to use the registered mark has become incontestable under section
1065 of this title, the registration shall be conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark,
and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark . . . . ").
42. See Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent Technologies, Inc., 935 F02d 1122, 1123 (10th
Cir. 1991) (holding an absence of likelihood of confusion caused the plaintiff's claims to
fail, so that there was no need to consider affirmative defenses); see also Venetianaire
Corp. of America v. A & P Import Co., 429 F.2d 1079, 1081 (2d Cir. 1970) ("[T]he critical
question in an action for infringement ... is likelihood of confusion . . . . ").
43. 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
44. R. G. Smith, 402 F.2d at 562.
45. Jd. at 562-63.
46. Jd. at 563.
47. Jd.
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In explaining its decision, the Ninth Circuit cited Saxlleher
v. Wagner.48 In Saxlleher, the Court held that the defendant
could use the plaintiff's trademark to identify a "bitter water"
that the defendant was copying:
They have a right to tell the public what they are
doing, and to get whatever share they can in the
popularity of the water by advertising that they
are trying to make the same article, and think
they succeed. If they do not convey, but, on the
contrary, exclude, the notion that they are selling
the plaintiff's goods, it is a strong proposition that
when the article has a well known name they have
not the right to explain by that name what they
imitate. By doing so, they are not trying to get
the good will of the name but the good will of the
goods .. &

The Ninth Circuit also relied on Societe Comptoir De
L'Industrie .Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac v. Alexander's
Department Stores, Inc. ~o In that case, the defendant advertised
that its dresses were copies of trademarked Christian Dior
dresses. The court reasoned:
The Lanham Act does not prohibit a commercial
rival's truthfully denominating his goods a copy
of a design in the public domain, though he uses
the name of the designer to do so. Indeed, it is
difficult to see any.other means that might be employed to inform the consuming public of the true
origin of the design. &1

The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant may use the trademark in its advertising to identify the product copied so long as
it does not create a likelihood that purchasers will be confused
as to the source, identity, or sponsorship of the advertiser's
product.~2

48. [d. at 564 (citing
49. R. G. Smith, 402
50. [d. at 565 (citing
51. R. G. Smith, 402
52. [d. at 563, 569.
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DEFENSES TO TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

1. Defenses in General

In addition to rebutting a plaintiff's prima facie case, other
defenses are available to a defendant in a trademark infringement suit. One defense is the First Amendment defense. A
trademark infringer may assert that the use of the trademark is
protected by the First Amendment.1i3
The district court in New Kids decided the case based on
the First Amendment.1i4 The court stated that "the First
Amendment provides immunity to the defendants . . . unless
their use of the plaintiff's trademark was wholly unrelated to
news gathering and dissemination, misleading as to content, or
falsely and explicitly denoted authorship, sponsorship, or endorsement by the New Kids on the Block."1i1i
The district court found that the polls conducted by the de7
fendants were a constitutionally protected news gathering activity because they intended to publish the results as news. liS The
district court also found that the New Kids had not alleged that
the newspapers' use of the "900" numbers was misleading as to
content or that the newspapers misrepresented that the New
Kids sponsored or endorsed the service.1i7
A second defense to trademark infringement rests in the
enumerated incontestability defenses of the Lanham Act.IiS The
plaintiff's case fails if: (1) the registration or incontestability
was obtained fraudulently,1i9 (2) the trademark has been aban53. See M.B.H. Enterprises, Inc. v. WOKY, Inc., 633 F.2d 50, 56 (7th Cir. 1980)
(acknowledging that the First Amendment was an issue in a trademark infringement
suit, though deciding the case on other grounds); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (considering the First Amendment as a possible defense, but rejecting it on the facts).
54. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1547 (holding that the plaintiff's claims for trademark infringement were barred by the First Amendment).
55. [d. at 1541-42.
56. [d. at 1545.
57. Id.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1988) (The defendant will prevail if one or more of the
enumerated defenses applies).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(l).
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doned,60 (3) the trademark holder or someone in privity with the
trademark holder is using the trademark to misrepresent the origin of the goods or services,61 (4) the use is a fair use,62 (5) the
defendant has used the trademark without knowledge of the registrant's prior use,63 (6) the defendant registered and used the
trademark prior to the registration of the plaintiff's mark,6. (7)
the trademark is being used to violate the antitrust laws of the
United States,611 or (8) equitable principles, including laches, estoppel, and acquiescence, apply.66
Because the Lanham Act specifies that the above are incontestability defenses,67 a court may require that a trademark have
achieved incontestability before the defenses can be asserted. 68
Even if the trademark has not become incontestable, the equitable defenses of laches, estoppel and acquiescence may still be
available. 69
This article focuses on the fair use defense because of its
similarity to the nominative use defense.
2.

The Fair Use Defense

As noted above, the fair use defense is one of the enumerated incontestability defenses of the Lanham Act. Section
1115(b)(4) creates a defense to trademark infringement,
provided:
the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of
the party's individual name in his own business,
or of the individual name of anyone in privity
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(2).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(3).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(6).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(8).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b).
68. See, e.g., Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1423 (9th
Cir. 1984) (reasoning that the fair use defense only applies to incontestable marks by the
terms of the Lanham Act, but acknowledging that a common law fair use defense may
exist).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) ("Any registration ... shall not preclude another person
from proving any legal or equitable defense . . . . ").
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with such party, or of a term or device which is
descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith
only to describe the goods or services of such
party, or their geographic origin ....70
The most common situation in which the fair use defense
arises is where the plaintiff's trademark is somehow descriptive,
and the defendant has used the trademark in a descriptive manner. One such case is Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse,
Inc.71 In Zatarains, the plaintiff owned rights to the registered
trademarks "Fish-Fri" and "Chick-Fri."72 The trademarks were
used in connection with fried food coating mixes that the plaintiff sold in rectangular cardboard boxes. 73 The defendants also
marketed competing fried food coating mixes. 7• One of the defendants, Oak Grove Smokehouse, marketed its products in
packets labeled with its name, emblem, and the terms "Fish
Fry" or "Chicken Fry."71i The other defendant marketed a product in a cylindrical container labeled "Visko's FISH FRY."78
In its decision, the court described the fair use defense:
The defense is available only in actions involving
descriptive terms and only when the term is used
in its descriptive sense rather than its trademark
sense. In essence, the fair use defense prevents a
trademark registrant from appropriating a descriptive term for its own use to the exclusion of
others, who may be prevented thereby from accurately describing their own goods. The holder of a
protectable descriptive mark has no legal claim to
an exclusive right in the primary, descriptive
meaning of the term; consequently, anyone is free
to use the term in its primary, descriptive sense
so long as such use does not lead to customer confusion as to the source of the goods or services. 77
70. 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(4). See also infra note 139 (enumerating the requirements of
the fair use defense).
71. 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983).
72. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 788.
73. Id.
74. Id. Two other competing companies marketed fried food coatings using the
terms "fish fry" or "chicken fry," but were not parties to the Zatarains litigation. Id.
75. Id.
76.Id.
77. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 791 (citations omitted).
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The court in Zatarains then applied the fair use defense to the
faCts. The court reasoned that other merchants were free to use
the words "fish fry" and "chicken fry" in their ordinary descriptive sense, as long as the use did not tend to confuse customers
as to the source of the goods. 78 The court found that the defendants had used the terms in good faith because they had not used
the terms in a trademark sense and never attempted to register
the words as a trademark. 79 The court also found that the defendants had consciously packaged their goods to minimize confusion. 80 As a result, the court held that the defendants were entitled to the fair use defense. 81

In Venetianaire Corp. of America v. A & P Import CO.,82
the plaintiff had a registered trademark in the word "Hygient,"
which it used in connection with the sale of mattress covers.83
The word "Hygient" was displayed in a white cross on a green
oval and was printed on each of the plaintiff's packages. 8• The
defendant distributed substantially identical mattress covers.811
The defendant's packages carried the word "Hygienic" in the
cross and oval design with exactly the same placement on the
package as the plaintiff's product. 8s
The court held that the defendant was not entitled to the
fair use defense because the trademark was used in a trademark
sense and was not used to describe the goods. 87 The court reasoned that the protection afforded to trademarks focuses on the
use of the words and not their meaning in the abstract. 88 The
court reasoned that had the defendant chosen a different trademark and then used the word "Hygienic" in a sentence or placed
the word "Hygienic" on the package, but not as part of the
trademark, there would be no trademark infringement because
78. Id. at 796.
79.Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 429 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1970).
83. Venetianaire, 429 F.2d at 1080.
84.Id.
8S. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1082 (explaining that fair use requires that the use be "otherwise than as a
mark ... only to describe the goods . . . . ") (citing IS U.S.C. §1l1S(b)(4)).
88. Id. (emphasis in original). But ct. Zatarains, Inc. 698 F.2d at 791 ("The defense
is available only in actions involving descriptive terms . . . . ").
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this would be a descriptive use. 89
In WCVB-TV u. Boston Athletic Association,90 the Boston
Athletic Association sued WCVB-TV for infringement of their
registered trademark, "Boston Marathon."91 WCVB-TV broadcasted the words "Boston Marathon" in connection with its coverage of the event. 92
The First Circuit court explained the fair use defense: "In
technical trademark jargon, the use of words for descriptive purposes is called a 'fair use,' and the law usually permits it even if
the words themselves constitute a trademark."93 The court then
offered an example: "If . . . a t-shirt maker placed the words
'Pure Cotton' (instead of the words 'Boston Marathon') on his tshirts merely to describe the material from which the shirts were
made, not even a shirt maker who had a registered trademark
called 'Pure Cotton' could likely enjoin their sale."94 The court
reasoned that the mark was used primarily in a descriptive manner, due to the "timing, meaning, context, intent, and surrounding circumstances," so that there was little likelihood of
confusion. 911
IV.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The New Kids brought trademark infringement claims
against the newspaper defendants for using the New Kids'
trademark in connection with their "900" number telephone
polls.96 The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of the New Kids'
claims by stating that the court was "free to affirm on any
ground fairly presented by the record"97 and that non-constituSee Venetianaire, 429 F.2d at 1082.
926 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991).
WCVB-TV, 926 F.2d at 42-43.
Jd. at 43.
Jd. at 46 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1988); Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 796).
94. Jd. (citing Leathersmith of London v. Alleyn, 695 F.2d 27, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1209 (1983).
95. Jd. The court was not clear whether its refusal to reverse the district court was
based on a finding of fair use or on a finding that there was no likelihood of confusion.
96. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. 1540.
97. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 305 (citing Jackson v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 881 F.2d
638,643 (9th Cir. 1989); Pelleport Inv., Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, 741 F.2d 273, 278
(9th Cir. 1984».
89.
90.
91.
92.
93,
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tional grounds for decision are preferred over constitutional
grounds. 9s Thus, the Ninth Circuit reached the trademark infringement claims that the district court did not because the
Ninth Circuit bypassed the constitutional issue, whereas the district court granted summary judgment on First Amendment
grounds. 99
The Ninth Circuit next discussed the history and purpose of
trademarks. Among the purposes identified were: identifying
sources of goods and services,loo tracing defective wares,IOI reducing consumer search costsl02 and preventing free-riding on a
rival's reputation. l03 The Ninth Circuit concluded that trademark infringement falls under unfair competition and is a form
of fraud upon the consumer. 104
The court then defined a trademark as a limited property
right in a word, phrase, or symboPOIi The court noted, however,
that an absolute restriction on the use of the trademark by anyone other than its owner would deplete the language. loa In response to this realization, courts recognize that the fair use defense applies only when the trademark is used "to describe the
goods or services of [a] party, or their geographic origin."107
The court gave examples where it is inconvenient or impossible to identify a product or service without using its trademark. los In one example, the court reasoned that "one might refer to the 'two-time world champions' or 'the professional
basketball team from Chicago,' but it's far simpler (and more
likely to be understood) to refer to the Chicago Bulls."109 In an98. Id. (citing In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 642-43 (1985); Schweiker v. Hogan, 457
U.S. 569, 585 (1982».
99. See New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1541-42.
100. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 305 (citing, SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADEMARKS 47 (1925».
101. Id. (citing SCHECHTER, supra note 100, at 47).
102. Id. (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987».
103. Id. (citing Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 742 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844».
104. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 305.
105. Id. at 306.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(4». See supra note 5 for the full text of
§ 1115(b)(4).
108. Id. at 306-07.
109. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 306.
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other example, the Ninth Circuit referred to a previous decision
in which it allowed an auto repair shop to use the word "Volkswagen" to describe to the public the make of cars that it repairs. llo Finally, the Ninth Circuit referred to the case where a
television station was allowed to describe the event it was going
to broadcast: the "Boston Marathon."lll The Ninth Circuit
stated that these are examples of using a trademark in a nontrademark sense, so infringement laws did not apply.ll2
Next, the court introduced its new nominative use test by
generalizing a class of instances where the trademark is not used
to capitalize on confusion or to appropriate the "cachet" of one
product for a different one:
Such nominative use of a mark-where the only
word reasonably available to describe a particular
thing is pressed into service-lies outside the
strictures of trademark law: Because it does not
implicate the source-identification function that
is the purpose of trademark, it does not constitute
unfair competition; such use is fair because it
does not imply sponsorship or endorsement by
the trademark holder.l13
The court explained that the nominative use test it was
enunciating differs from the classic fair use defense because, in
the classic fair use situation, the defendant has used the trademark to describe the defendant's productY4 Here, the New Kids
trademark has been used to describe the New Kids themselves. lUI The court made clear that it did not purport to alter
the "paradigmatic" fair use test that applies when the defendant
has used the trademark to refer to something other than the
plaintiff's product. 1l6
The court outlined the requirements of the new, nominative
use defense to trademark infringement:
110. [d. at 307 (citing Volkswagen-werk Aktiengenesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d
350 (9th Cir. 1969».
111. [d. (citing WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass'n, 926 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991)).
112. [d.
113. [d. at 307-08.
114. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308.
115. [d.
116. [d.
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[W]here the defendant uses a trademark to describe the plaintiff's product, rather than its own,
we hold that a commercial user is entitled to a
nominative fair use defense provided he meets the
following three requirements: First, the product
or service in question must be one not readily
identifiable without use of the trademark; second,
only so much of the mark or marks may be used
as is reasonably necessary to identify the product
or service; and third, the user must do nothing
that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark
holder.l17

The Ninth Circuit next applied the nominative use test to
the facts presented. The court compared the New Kids to the
Chicago Bulls, Volkswagen and Boston Marathon situations,
finding that it would be impossible for anyone who did not know
the names of the individual New Kids to refer to them without
using their trademark. u8 The court continued by stating that
the New Kids deserve protection against copycats and false endorsements, but not against "rendering newspaper articles, conversations, polls, and comparative advertising."1l9 Therefore, the
first requirement of the nominative use test was met. 120
Because THE STAR and USA TODAY only referred to the
New Kids to the extent necessary to identify them as the subject
of the polls and the distinctive logo was not used, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the second requirement was met as wel1. 121
The court did not think that anything in the announcements suggested joint sponsorship or endorsement by the New
Kids. 122 In fact, the court pointed out that The USA TODAY poll
implied the contrary by asking if the New Kids are a "turn
Off."123 So, the court concluded that the third requirement was
117. [d.
118. [d. ("[H]ow could someone not conversant with the proper names of the indi-

vidual New Kids talk about the group at all.")
119. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308.
120.
121.
122.
123.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 308-09.
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also satisfied. 124
The New Kids argued that the newspaper polls competed
directly with the New Kids themselves. 121i They reasoned that,
even if newspapers are entitled to the nominative use defense,
the polls should be excepted because they were not part of the
news gathering activities of the newspapers. 126 Although the
Ninth Circuit gave some credence to this argument, the court
ultimately rejected it.127 The New Kids have a property right in
their name, but cannot control how their fans spend money.128
Because the use does not imply sponsorship or endorsement, the
fact that it is done for profit is beside the point. 129 The court
compared the use to an unauthorized biography or a parody.130
Therefore, the newspapers were entitled to the nominative
use defense and summary judgment was proper for the first
seven causes of action. l3l The Ninth Circuit continued by addressing the New Kids' three additional claims.
The court rejected the commercial and common-law misap124. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 309.
125. /d.
126. /d.
127. /d. (explaining that the New Kids' argument was "not entirely implausible").
128. /d.
129. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 309 (citing Universal City Studios, v. Ideal Publishing
Corp., 195 U.S.P.Q. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that a magazine's use of TV program's
trademark "Hardy Boys" in connection with photographs of the show's stars was not
infringing); International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912
(9th Cir. 1990) (finding no infringement where unauthorized jewelry maker produced
rings and pins bearing fraternal organization's trademark)).
130. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 309.
A trademark may even be used lawfully in a way that many
people, including· the trademark owner, may find offensive.
Consider Girl Scout v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F.
Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969): Defendants published a poster
showing "a smiling girl dressed in the well-known green uniform of the Junior Girl Scouts, with her hands clasped above
her protruding, clearly pregnant abdomen. The caveat 'BE
PREPARED' appears next to her hands." The court found no
infringement: "[Rlational analysis of the situation does not indicate a likelihood that the public will believe that the Girl
Scouts are the authors of the poster to which they understandably take such violent exception."
New Kids, 971 F.2d at 307 n.5 (citations omitted).
131. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 309.
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propriation claims which were based on state law.132 Under California law, the claims were barred if the trademark was used "in
connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or
account."133 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that this provision applied to the telephone polls because the results were to be published later as part of a news story.134
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the New Kids' claim of intentional interference with potential economic advantage. 1311 The
court reasoned that "it is no tort to beat a business rival to prospective customers,"136 nor is the use of a trademark a tort when
the use has been found to be "fair and reasonable."137 Judge
Kozinski summarized the Ninth Circuit's view of this last claim
when he reminded the New Kids of the maxim: "all's fair in
love, war and the free market."136
V.

CRITIQUE

A.

COMPARING THE REQUIREMENTS OF NOMINATIVE USE WITH
THE REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR USE

A comparison of the nominative use defense to the fair use
defense reveals that the two defenses are largely duplicative and
may lead to similar substantive results, making the nominative
use defense unnecessary.139 In addition, we will see that nomina132. [d.
133. [d. at 309-10 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d); Leidholdt v. L. F. P., Inc., 860
F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989); Maheu v. CBS, 247 Cal.
Rptr. 304, 312-13 (Ct. App. 1988); Eastwood v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349, 352
(Ct. App. 1983) (extending the section 3344(d) defense to common law misappropriation
claims)).
134. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 310.
135. [d.
136. [d. (citing A-Mark Coin Co. v. General Mills, Inc. 195 Cal. Rptr. 859, 867 (Ct.
App. 1983)); 5 BERNARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW. Torts § 669 at 766
(1988) ("[Olne competitor may induce customers of the other to do business with him.").
137. See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 310.
138. [d.
139. The requirements of fair use are: (1) the defendant used the word or symbol to
merely describe its product, (2) that it did not use the word or symbol as a trademark,
and (3) that it used the word or symbol in good faith. See, e.g., Institute for Scientific
Info., v. Gordon and Breach, 743 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1990). These requirements are
merely a court translation of the Lanham Act § 1115(b)(4).
The requirements of the nominative use defense are: (1) the product or service in
question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark, (2) only so
much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the prod-
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tive use may be confusing.
1.

Trademark Necessary to Identify Product

The first element of nominative use, that the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use
of the trademark, may exist within the traditional fair use defense. Recall that the fair use defense requires that the trademark be used in a descriptive sense.
In the Volkswagen repair shop situation, the Ninth Circuit
permitted an auto repair shop to use the trademark "Volkswagen" to describe to the public the make of cars that it repaired. 140 By using the trademark "Volkswagen," was the defendant identifying the product of the plaintiff (nominative use)
or was the defendant describing the defendant's own product
(fair use)? The answer is the defendant was doing both. Similarly, in New Kids, were the newspapers using the trademark
"The New Kids" to identify The New Kids on the Block or to
describe their own product: a New Kids on the Block telephone
poll? The answer is they were doing both. From these examples,
it seems that describing the defendant's product can be accomplished by identifying the plaintiff's product. The fair use defense, however, includes additional descriptive uses such as in
Zatarains 141 where the defendant described his product as "fish
fry" even though the plaintiff's trademark was "Fish-Fri."
Recall that one of the primary purposes of trademarks is to
identify the source of goods or services. 142 Consumers use trademarks to search out quality goods. They buy products they have
bought in the past or that they have heard about through wordof-mouth or advertising. Consumers, however, do not really care
who produces the goods; they care only whether a particular
trademark denotes products they want to buy.143 This is why
uct or service, and (3) the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the
mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder. New Kids, 971 F.2d
at 308.
140. Volkswagen-werk Aktiengenesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1969).
141. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983).
142. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 305 (citing SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE LAW RELATING TO TRADEMARKS 47 (1925». See supra note 100 and accompanying
text.
143. See, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316,
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companies expend effort advertising their products in such a
way as to promote name recognition in their trademarks. The
result is that trademarks may be the only way to readily identify
particular goods and services because consumers do not know
the name of their source. I44 The only goods or services that this
would not apply to are those that have not achieved name recognition. As the Ninth Circuit has indicated, it is often virtually
impossible to refer to a product without using its trademark.1411
This means that identifying a product by its trademark is just
another way of describing the product.
The Ninth Circuit provided little guidance to clarify the application of the first element of nominative use.146 In applying
the first element, the court reasoned that the New Kids' situation was similar to the Chicago Bulls, Volkswagen, and Boston
Marathon situations indicating that there is no other reasonable
way to describe the New Kids. I47 The court, however, went on to
say that the New Kids deserved protection against copycats and
false endorsements, but not against newspaper articles, conversations, polls and comparative advertising. 148 This statement
seems to indicate that the New Kids deserve protection against
likelihood of confusion (copycats, false endorsements, unfair
comparative advertising), but not against First Amendment freedoms (news dissemination, conversations and polls). Though this
1324 (9th Cir. 1982) (reporting survey results where 65% of respondents who said that
they had recently purchased the board game "Monopoly" or intended to purchase the
game in the near future, chose: "I want 'Monopoly' primarily because I am interested in
playing 'Monopoly,' I don't care much who makes it;" 32% chose: "I would like Parker
Brother's 'Monopoly' game primarily because I like Parker Brother's products."); R. G.
Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968) ("Preservation of the trademark
as a means of identifying the trademark owner's products ... serves an important public purpose. It makes effective competition possible in a complex, impersonal marketplace by providing a means through which the consumer can identify products which
please him and reward the producer with continued patronage.") (footnote omitted).
144. See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308 ("[H]ow could someone not conversant with the
proper names of the individual New Kids talk about the New Kids at all?"); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976). Union Carbide, the owner of
the trademark "EVEREADY" sued Ever-Ready, Inc. for using the term "Ever-Ready" in
the sale of lamps and light bulbs. A survey conducted by a market research expert found
that over 50% of those surveyed associated a lamp made by Ever-Ready, Inc. with Union
Carbide's products, such as batteries, while only about 1 % associated the lamp with
Union Carbide itself. [d. at 386.
145. New Kids, 971 F.2d. at 306.
146. See id. at 308-09.
147. Id. at 308.
148. Id.
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is a valid point, it does not belong in the discussion of the first
element of nominative use because it does not logically support
the argument that the New Kids cannot be readily described
without using their trademark.
Consequently, the first requirement of nominative use, that
the product not be readily identifiable without using its trademark, is included within the fair use requirement that the trademark be used in a descriptive sense.
2.

Trademark Use Limited to that Reasonably Necessary

The limitation of the second element of nominative use,
that the user may only use the mark as much as is reasonably
necessary to identify the product or services, can be inferred
from the fair use requirement of good faith. Good faith encompasses an absence of intent to defraud another or to seek an unconscionable advantage. u9 A defendant who uses a trademark
more than is reasonably necessary to serve a legitimate purpose
is arguably not acting in good faith. 1110
In applying the second element, the court did not explain
the scope of trademark use that fits within the doctrine's protection to define the "reasonably necessary" requirement of the second element of nominative use. 11I1 In THE STAR, according to the
Ninth Circuit's statement of the facts, the name of the group
was used in an ad that ran next to a story about the group and a
picture of the group was used with the ad!1I2 In USA TODAY, the
name of the group was used and a picture of the group appeared
next to the ad. The court did not apply the "reasonably necessary" requirement of the nominative use defense to these facts.
Therefore, the second requirement of nominative use, that
the defendant. may only use the trademark as much as is reason149. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 693 (6th ed. 1990).
150. Compare Venetianaire Corp. of America v. A & P Import Co., 429 F.2d 1079,
1083 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding that defendant who adopted a trademark and packaging
almost identical to the plaintiff's was not acting in good faith) with M.B.H. Enterprises
v. WOKY, Inc., 633 F.2d 50, 54 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding good faith existed where the
defendant had no intent to confuse the public).
151. See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308.
152. Id. at 304.
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ably necessary to identify the product or services, is equivalent
to the fair use requirement of good faith.
3. No Suggestion of Sponsorship or Endorsement

The third element of nominative use, that the user must do
nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement of the trademark holder, must be satisfied as part of the plaintiff's prima facie case of infringement.
Recall that the third element of the prima facie case for trademark infringement is that the plaintiff must show likelihood of
confusion as to the source of the products or services.l~3 The requirement that there must be no suggestion of sponsorship or
endorsement can be seen to be just a different way of stating
that there must be no likelihood of confusion as to the source of
the products or services. By making this requirement part of the
nominative use defense, however, the Ninth Circuit shifts the
burden of proof to the defendant whereas the Lanham Act
places it on plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit did not purport to eliminate this element from the prima facie case. Consequently, the
result is that in a close case, where the burden of proof on this
issue has not been met, it is unclear whether the plaintiff or defendant should prevail.
As with the first and second requirements of nominative
use, the court performed little analysis to explain the third requirement of the nominative use test.l~4 The court simply concluded that there was no suggestion of sponsorship because
neither ad suggested sponsorship, and USA TODAY asked if the
New Kids were a "turn off."llili The third element, however,
seems to require a somewhat subjective determination as to
whether the use implies or does not imply sponsorship so that a
clear articulation of which impression a consumer is likely to get
may be difficult.
The Ninth Circuit, however, may have purposely left its discussion of the application of all three parts of the nominative
153. Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 802 F. Supp. 1386, 1394 (D.S.C. 1992)
(citing Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 373 (1991)); see supra notes 32 & 35 and accompanying text.
154. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308-09.
155. Id.
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use test somewhat bare in order to allow greater latitude to the
district courts in the future. This may allow the district courts
to expand upon the reasoning behind the nominative use doctrine in future cases.
In New Kids, the Ninth Circuit could have affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on alternative grounds.
The Ninth Circuit found that the third element of nominative
use was satisfied. 1I16 This means that the New Kids failed to
make out their prima facie case; the use of the New Kids' trademark was not confusing because the use did not imply sponsorship. Had the court adopted this reasoning, there would have
been no need to address either the nominative use defense or
the fair use defense.
The Ninth Circuit stated that other courts hold, as a matter
of law, that no sponsorship is implied when the trademark is
used in a descriptive manner.1II7 This article has demonstrated
that the third element of nominative use is included in the
plaintiff's prima facie case. Even if it is not, it is implicitly included in the good faith requirement of the fair use defense. In
New Kids, because the newspapers satisfied the nominative use
requirement that the user not do anything that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement of
the trademark holder, the defendants also satisfy the fair use
requirement of good faith.
Therefore, each of the requirements of the nominative use
defense is already a requirement of the fair use defense. Moreover, nominative use clouds the issue of who has the burden to
prove likelihood of confusion.

B.

CAN NOMINATIVE USE BE DISTINGUISHED FROM FAIR USE?

There may be three possible ways of distinguishing the
nominative use defense from the fair use defense: whether the
mark was used descriptively or was used otherwise than as a
trademark, whether the use was descriptive of the plaintiff's or
156. [d. at 308.
157. [d. at 306.
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the defendant's product and whether the defendant had profit
as a motive.
One element of the fair use defense, that the trademark
must be used otherwise than as a mark/ 58 is not part of the
nominative use defense. In this sense, the fair use defense is
more restrictive than the nominative use defense. However, if a
trademark is used in a descriptive sense, arguably it has not
been used as a trademark. For example, we have already determined that the newspapers' use of the trademark "The New
Kids" was descriptive in that it described the newspapers' polls
and that the use was in good faith. It follows that the defendants used the trademark otherwise than as a trademark in the
sense that they did not adopt it as their own. Compare this situation to Venetianaire, where the use was as a trademark because the defendant adopted the plaintiff's trademark. I59 Also
compare New Kids to R. G. Smith where the defendant was allowed to actually use the plaintiff's trademark "Chanel No.
5. "160

Therefore, the fair use requirement that the trademark be
used otherwise than as a trademark does not serve to distinguish
nominative use from fair use.
The Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish the two defenses by stating that the fair use defense applies when the defendant is describing the defendant's product, whereas the nominative use defense applies when the defendant is describing the
plaintiff or the plaintiff's product. I61 This distinction is confusing because it is difficult to know if the nominative use defense
or the fair use defense applies to a particular situation. As we
saw before, it was not entirely clear whether the newspapers
were describing their own service, the telephone poll, or the New
Kids themselves. The trademark seems always to refer to the
product associated with it: the plaintiff's product. Therefore,
158. See supra note 5 for the full text of § 1115(b)(4).
159. Venetianaire, 429 F.2d at 1082 ("[lIt is plain that A & P Import did not use
the word otherwise than as a trade ... mark ... only to describe the goods.") (internal
quotation omitted).
160. R. G. Smith, 402 F.2d at 569 ("Appellants do not use appellees' trademark as a
generic term. They employ it only to describe appellees' product, not to identify their
own.").
161. See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308.
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there does not seem to be a way of distinguishing fair use from
nominative use.

In addressing the New Kids' argument against the defendant's commercial purpose and direct competition, the court held
that a profit motive is not a factor in the nominative use defense. 162 In so doing, the court may have avoided a potential
problem with the application of this doctrine to other situations.
In a capitalist society, almost every activity is arguably for
profit. For example, even if the newspapers did not use "900"
numbers, but used "800" numbers, the sale of the newspapers
that included the poll results would still generate revenue.
Profit motive, however, is not a factor in the fair use defense
in trademark law. In the examples discussed so far, the defendant did profit from using the defendant's trademark. 163 Consequently, profit motive does not serve to distinguish nominative
use from fair use.

C.

NOMINATIVE USE ADDS TO EXISTING CONFUSION

Courts do not always make a clear distinction between likelihood of confusion, an element of the prima facie case for trademark infringement/ 64 and the descriptive sense of a trademark,
an essential element of the fair use defense. 1611 Additionally, one
court may choose to base its holding in a case on fair use, while
another court may base its holding on lack of confusion when
the facts of the two cases are the same or similar.166
162. See id. at 309.
163. WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Association, 926 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991);

Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983); Venetianaire Corp. of America v. A & P Import Co., 429 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1970); R. G. Smith v.
Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968); see supra notes 43-95 and accompanying text.
164. Shakespeare, 802 F. Supp. at 1394; see supra notes 32 & 34 and accompanying
text.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1988).
166. See, e.g., Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent Technologies, Inc., 935 F.2d 1122 (10th
Cir. 1991). The Tenth Circuit held that no likelihood of confusion existed where the
defendant used the plaintiff's registered trademark "Coherent" to describe its lasers. Id.
at 1123, 1126. "Coherent" is a term that is descriptive of the light emitted from all lasers.
Id. at 1123-24. The district court analyzed the fair use defense first, then the likelihood
of confusion issue. Id. at 1124. The circuit court criticized the district court, stating, "By
addressing the issues in this order, the district court left unclear the relationship be-
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An interesting point about the fair use defense was made in
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema. 167 The court
reasoned that it would be somewhat anomalous to apply a fair
use defense to trademark infringement because that would mean
that a use of a trademark that had first been found to be confusing could then be found to be a fair use. 168
As can be seen from the previous discussion of New Kids,
the nominative use test seems likely to cause confusion and may
be unnecessary due to its similarity to fair use. Also, it is unclear
when nominative use or fair use should apply because the distinction between describing the trademark holder's product and
the defendant's product is not very clear. The Ninth Circuit did
not address or explain either of these concerns in New Kids.
The Ninth Circuit has also added to existing confusion by
including in the nominative use defense the requirement that
the defendant do nothing to show sponsorship, whereas the Lanham Act places the equivalent burden of proof on the plaintiff to
show likelihood of confusion.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In New Kids, the Ninth Circuit introduced and explained a
new nominative use test that applies when a defendant uses a
rival's trademark as a means of identifying the rival's product.
This nominative use doctrine seems to have some drawbacks
which may make it difficult to apply. First, nominative use appears to be substantively equivalent to fair use. Second, nominative use clouds the issue of who carries the burden to prove likelihood of confusion. Third, it is unclear to which cases
nominative use or fair use should be applied.
Unless the Ninth Circuit is able to clarify the advantages
tween incontestable status and the need ,to show likelihood of confusion." [d. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed on the likelihood of confusion issue so that the fair use defense did not
need to be addressed. [d.
167. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206
n.9 (2d Cir. 1979).
168. [d. ("Because the primary purpose of the trademark laws is to protect the public from confusion, it would be somewhat anomalous to hold that the confusing use of
another's trade.mark is 'fair use'.") (citations omitted).
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and application of its nominative use defense, courts would be
wise to discard the nominative use defense in favor of the fair
use defense.
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